David Harris
Amstd475-01
Professor Plemons
3/5/15
In
“Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age”, Manuel
Castells outlines his points about the Egyptian Revolution of 2011. Castells
main arguments is that through social media and networking the Egyptian
Revolution gained power and support that procured the revolution to heights it
could not have secured without.. Because
of revolution, the Mubarak government shutdown internet access in Egypt for
about a week. During this period Egyptian citizens were reliant on other forms
of technology (fax, telephone, radio) to continue to voice their message.
International aid also came to Egypt in the form of media coverage, modem
support, and free international calling. The restoration of the internet occurred
about a week later. Castells argues that besides economics (Egypt lost 3-4% of
its GDP in that time) there was no point of shutting down the internet anymore—the
threshold of power was crossed. Mubarak no longer had any control on the size
and scope of the issue. The revolution
did not stop with the overthrow of Mubarak. The Supreme Council of Armed Forces
(SCAF) then tried to consolidate power and impose the Selmi document . The Selmi
document “basically gave full control of the state and limitless autonomy to
the Armed Forces” (76). A massive protest then took place in Tahrir Square and
the revolutionary slogan was changed from “Down with Mubarak” to “Down with
military rule” (77). This event attests to the determination and fortitude of
those of the Egyptian Revolution and the continued power of the internet as
word spread about the protest through various social media sites. Social media
can be seen as irreplaceable in the Egyptian Revolution as it created a new
sphere where ideas could be shared and mobilization of forces could occur.
An interesting part of Castells argument that
can be related to this class is his analysis of power dynamics and fear in
Egypt. Castells defines power as “a
combination of coercion and intimidation with persuasion and consensus building”
(78). Mubarak had exercised power throughout his rule until the legitimacy of
his government was lost. The legitimacy was eroded by continued failures in the
economy (increase in food prices, widespread poverty). Always, instability in
the economy triggers fear throughout a society. That fear turned to anger with
the crony practices of Mubarak’s government and through social media, anger was
broadcasted on a large scale. Social protests began to occur because of the widespread
anger. While in class on Monday (3/2) we watched a video of Castells speaking
about his ideas. He at one point commented that at the heart of every social
movement is emotion—specifically when fear turns to anger. Fear turned to anger
with the Egyptian Revolution without the internet; however, because of the
internet the anger could be circulated to thousands of citizens with a single
click. The internet allows for the anger of the people to become widely known
in seconds. The dynamics of power and fear are still the same but there is now
a greater likely hood for fear to turn to anger and thus anger to power. Power
was thus transposed from government to the people. So far we have been
extremely critical of calling the internet a “democratizing instrument” ;
however, in this case it looks as if it did just that.
One instance that I thought Castells
complicated this scenario is with Tunisia and hope. Because Tunisia showed the
people of Egypt that “if everybody would come together and fight uncompromisingly
to the end, regardless of the risks”, it was possible to topple an unjust government
(81). The addition of hope is what I see as necessary; the Egyptian citizens
know that progress is possible. I wish that Castell would have centered this
idea of hope in his argument more. Hope seemed just as integral as fear yet he
emphasized fear and anger drastically more. Also it would be interesting if
then Castells would extend his argument to the global perspective of the Arab
Spring. This, of course, would require greater research and would not entirely
focus as Egypt as an effect but a catalyst.
I really enjoyed how this text took a specific
historical event and put it into context using the power of social media. Castells
wrote that “The Internet revolution does not negate the territorial character
of the revolutions through history. Instead it extends it from the space of
places to the space of flows” (61). He then uses Egypt as an example of how the
internet changed the possibilities of communication. When the people then came to Tahrir Square
they came in large numbers but already with many of the ideology of the
revolution already constructed. Also the ideology can change using social media
(example can be seen with how the rallying cry changed from “Down with Mubarak”
to “Down with military rule”). The Women’s Media Center explained why this
change needed to occur: “We may have deposed Mubarak, but the regime, led by the
SCAF, is still intact” (77). Castell then showed the importance of the internet
as ideology does not stagnate and change in practice can occur –not just
leaders.
This
text adds to my appreciation for the internet. So far throughout the class I
feel as if a negative light has been constantly fixed on the internet and
social media. This article by Castells shows that social media and the internet
can have a democratizing and positive effect on a situation. Also, I am a
history major so this article was right up my alley.